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This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in 
demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: 
desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of 
the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect: desisting 
a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in 
previously competitive markets. We also consider policy implications of our analysis 
regarding an antitrust authority's investment decision in cartel enforcement. 
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This paper analyzes the eect of demand linkages and antitrust enforcement on dy-
namic cartel formation when rms operate in several markets. A number of recent
antitrust cases have highlighted the importance of demand relationships for multi-
market cartels. In the aftermath of the Global Vitamins Cartel case, non-US buyers
of bulk vitamins brought a class action to recover treble damages under US law for
anticompetitive behavior occurring entirely outside of US commerce.1 The foreign
plaintis claimed that
\...the cartel raised prices around the world in order to keep prices in equi-
librium with United States prices in order to avoid a system of arbitrage
and therefore that the foreign plaintis were injured as a direct result of the
increases in United States prices even though they bought vitamins abroad."
(Empagran SA v. F. Homan-LaRoche, Ltd., 315F.3d 338, 431 (D.C. Cir.
2003))
In other words, it was suggested that in the presence of a negative demand linkage
between dierent geographic markets a cartel in one market is necessary for sustaining
the cartel in the other market. In 2004, the Supreme Court dismissed this argument
and rejected the plaintis' claim.
Positive demand linkages arise when products are complements. The Vitamin D3
cartel, one of the 16 cartelized products during the Vitamin conspiracy, sold the ma-
jority of its production in an animal feed blend with Vitamin A known as \AD3". In
1992 Solvay Pharmaceuticals, a major producer of Vitamin D3, initiated contacts with
Roche, producer of Vitamin A and D3 and at the time already involved in cartels in
at least 11 product groups (including vitamin A). Roche, however, had no great desire
to put up the price for D3 and stated
\its interest was to keep the D3 price premium in AD3 combinations low
so as to boost its sales of the far more protable vitamin A in the AD3
compound." (European Commission Decision, 2003, para 459)
According to Roche, Solvay persisted and nally persuaded all D3 producers to meet
and agree to a formal cartel scheme in early 1994. The Vitamin D3 cartel was the last
1Under an FTAIA exception to the Sherman Act foreign anticompetitive conduct falls under US
jurisdiction if \such conduct has a direct, substantial and foreseeable eect" on US commerce.
1of all vitamin cartels to start and it ended before the big cartels, including Vitamin
A which lasted until February 1999.2 Moreover, during its existence the vitamin D3
cartel had the lowest price increase and mark-up of all cartels.3
In this paper we construct a model of multi-market contact with demand linkages
and analyze the interplay of cartel formation and antitrust interventions. Consider an
industry with two symmetric, demand-related markets and two rms active in both
markets. Firms engage in repeated price competition over an innite horizon and
use trigger strategies that punish deviation in any market with innite reversion to
the perfectly competitive, static equilibrium of the stage game. Collusion leaves hard
evidence that is detectable. In each market and period with an active cartel, the
antitrust authority receives a cartel lead (say, from customers or disgruntled employees)
with an exogenous probability. In our benchmark model the antitrust agency can
prosecute a cartel in a given market only if it receives a cartel lead. Upon prosecution,
the cartel is desisted, rms revert to competition in this market and an antitrust ne
is imposed.
Our analysis shows that optimal dynamic cartel formation depends on whether a
cartel in one market is easier to sustain if the adjacent market is cartelized or competi-
tive. Two factors contribute to this relationship: the nature of the demand linkage and
the eect of prots on cartel stability. If the demand linkage is negative (i.e. products
are substitutes), then a cartel in the adjacent market increases demand and prots in
the current market. If the demand linkage is positive (i.e. products are complements),
it has the opposite eect. At the same time prots enter both discounted expected
prots if the cartel persists in the next period and the gain from deviation. Cartel
prots have a stronger eect on the former, and thereby a positive eect on cartel sta-
bility, if the discount factor is high and/or the detection probability is low. In contrast,
if rms are less patient and/or detection and prosecution is more likely, then higher
prots reduce cartel stability.
From this interaction we derive two important and intuitive eects of antitrust en-
forcement. First, we show that cartel prosecution in one market can have a knock-on
eect on cartel activities in the adjacent market. If products are suciently close
substitutes and the probability of cartel detection is low, then the desistance of one
2In August 1997 Roche, seemingly under the impression of the increased antitrust activities in the
US, informed the other cartel members it would withdraw from their agreements although the parties
continued their cartel arrangements until June 1998 (European Commission Decision, 2003, para 480,
628).
3The US price increase during the plea period for D3 was 19% compared to 61% for Vitamin A
and 40% on average for all vitamins. It also had by far the lowest price mark-up of 15.6% compared
to 48.8% for Vitamin A and 43.7 on average (Connor, 2007, chap 11, p. 275).
2cartel reduces prots and cartel stability in the adjacent market and triggers the inter-
nal break-up of the second cartel. Second, if rms operate in markets with a positive
demand linkage, antitrust enforcement can have a waterbed eect. Successful prose-
cution of a cartel in one market increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and
rms cartelize a previously competitive market. Such sequential cartels occur for two
reasons. Collusion in both markets might not be sustainable whereas a cartel in one
market at a time is feasible. Or, a sequential cartel yields higher expected prots
compared to colluding in both market simultaneously.
We then extend this benchmark model and investigate the implications of these
eects for the incentives of an antitrust authority (AA) to invest ex ante in prosecution
resources. A higher prosecution budget allows the AA to conduct more comprehensive
investigations. If one cartel is detected, the authority can (if necessary) extend its
investigation and prosecute the cartel in the adjacent market. Firms anticipate these
antitrust spillovers which has two eects. It induces rms to form sequential cartels
more often and it deters the ex ante formation of cartels. We show that the optimal
prosecution budget is a function of the level of available ex ante deterrence and the
demand linkage. If deterrence is low, the authority invests if and only if products are
neither close complements nor close substitutes. With strong complements rms form
sequential cartels independent of prosecution resources and antitrust spillovers are not
eective. If products are close substitutes, the AA benets from the knock-on eect of
cartel prosecution in one market. If deterrence is intermediate such that rms cartelize
both markets if and only if the AA has a low prosecution budget, then investing in
prosecution resources is optimal only if products are substitutes or weak complements.
Edwards (1955) rst proposed the idea that the multiplicity of contacts among
conglomerate rms may induce \mutual forbearance" and \blunt the edge of their
competition". Bernheim and Whinston (1990) formalize this idea by showing that
multi-market contact allows rms to pool the incentive constraints of the markets
they operate in. Thereby, rms can transfer slack from more collusive markets to the
markets where the incentive constraint is binding. In contrast, if rms and markets
are identical, then multi-market contact does not strengthen rms' ability to collude.4
We introduce both demand linkages and antitrust enforcement in the framework of
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and analyze the dynamic interplay of internal cartel
stability and the AA's cartel prosecution strategy.
Our paper also relates to the literature on cartel antitrust enforcement. In partic-
ular, there is a small, but growing, literature on cartel pricing in the presence of an
4Spagnolo (1999) shows that the pro-collusive eect of multi-market contact is further strengthened
if rms' prots enter a concave objective function.
3antitrust authority, and the eects of leniency programs on cartel stability.5 However,
none of these papers deals with multi-market contact and demand linkages.6 In a com-
panion paper, Choi and Gerlach (2009), we analyze international antitrust enforcement
when global rms operate cartels in markets within dierent antitrust jurisdictions. We
demonstrate that demand linkages entail enforcement externalities across jurisdictions
and a free-rider problem for local antitrust authorities. As a result, enforcement incen-
tives may be non-linear in the degree of integration of the global economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the basic
model. Section 3 analyzes the benchmark case in which the antitrust authority has
limited prosecution resources and only prosecutes cartels for which it receives cartel
leads. Section 4 analyzes the AA's incentives to invest in prosecution resources. Section
5 discusses and concludes.
2 The Model
Consider two products j = A;B and two rms, i = 1;2 selling both products. The
otherwise symmetric markets are linked through demand. Demand for good j is dened
by Dj(;pj;p j)  D(;pj;p j). Interchanging the prices of the two goods leads to
an interchange of individual demand, and if the two products sell at the same price
they have the same demand. The demand linkage is represented by the parameter
 with  2 [;  ],  < 0 <  , which measures the degree of substitutability and
complementarity of the products. Assume the own price eect is negative and always
dominates the cross price eect. The cross price eect is negative (positive) if  is
negative (positive). Thus, if    < 0, the products are complements; if 0 <  <  , the
products are substitutes. The products are independent if  = 0. Further assume that
the cross price eect increases (at equal prices) in , i.e. as this parameter increases,
products become closer substitutes (or weaker complements). And, as  approaches 
( ), the products become perfect complements (substitutes).
The two rms are identical and produce with a constant marginal cost c. Dene
5Harrington (2004, 2005) analyzes optimal cartel pricing when rms are concerned about creating
suspicion and avoiding detection and prosecution. For recent work on leniency programs see Motta
and Polo (2003), Aubert et al. (2006) and Harrington (2008).
6Roux and von Ungern-Sternberg (2007) analyze leniency programs in a multi-market setting
without demand linkages to evaluate the DOJ's Amnesty Plus policy. They use a static model which
precludes the analysis of cartel formation incentives. Nocke and White (2007) investigate cartel
formation in vertically related industries. Their focus is on the eects of vertical mergers on upstream
cartel formation and they do not consider antitrust enforcement of cartels.




Further denote 2() as the per market industry prot if rms choose (symmetric)






[(pj   c)Dj(;pj;p j) + (p j   c)D j(;pj;p j)]:




1() < 0, 0
1()  20
2()
(A2) 1() = 22(), 1(0) = 2(0), 1( ) = 0 < 2( )
Assumption (A1) states that industry prots per market strictly decrease in the demand
linkage parameter when the adjacent market is competitive. The eect of  on prots
with a competitive adjacent market is at least twice as strong as its eect on prots if
the adjacent market is collusive.7 Assumption (A2) states that if products are perfect
complements rms are able to extract total industry rents in one market independent
of whether the other market is cartelized or not. If  = 0, per market prots are strictly
positive and independent of the adjacent market. With perfect substitutes, industry
prots are zero if one market is competitive and strictly positive if both markets are
cartelized. Two more properties follow from these two sets of assumptions. Total
industry prots across the two markets are weakly higher if rms cartelize both rather
than one market. And it holds that 2()  (<)1() if and only if   (<)0.
If products are substitutes (complements), then the industry prot in one market is
higher if the adjacent market is collusive (competitive).
The above assumptions hold across many commonly used demand structures. In
particular, they apply to industries with dierentiated products as well as to situations
in which a homogenous product is sold in dierent geographic markets. We will use
the following linear demand structure for dierentiated goods, introduced by Singh &
Vives (1984), to illustrate some of our results.
Example 1 [Dierentiated Products]. Assume two dierentiated products and a
unit mass of identical consumers with utility function





A + 2xAxB + x
2
B) + H
7This condition ensures that the thresholds F4 and FS
4 in Lemma 3 and 5, respectively, are upward
sloping in . To ensure a unique intersection of the thresholds in our analysis, one could alternatively
impose regularity conditions on the second derivatives of the prot functions.
5where xj is consumption of product j, H is consumption of the Hicksian composite
commodity and ,  2 [ 1;1], is the demand linkage parameter. Suppose both rms
produce each of the two dierentiated products. From the analysis in Singh & Vives
(1984) follows 1() = (1   )(1   c)2=[4(1 + )] and 2() = (1   c)2=[4(1 + )].
Alternatively, for the case of substitutes, our formulation covers the case where a ho-
mogenous good is sold in two geographic markets and the cost of arbitrage determines
the degree of the demand linkage.
Example 2 [Geographic Markets]. Assume two local markets with a demand of
D(p) for a homogenous good. The good is produced by two global rms who sell in
both markets. Denote pm and m the local monopoly price and prots, respectively.
Consumers have transportation (or arbitrage) cost of t  0 per unit. They buy in their
local market if the lowest local price is less or equal than the sum of the lowest price in
the other market plus transportation cost. Dene    pm  c and      t. Then, for
any  2 [0;  ], it holds that 1() = (    )D(c +     ) and 2() = m.
Firms are engaged in a repeated game in discrete time and maximize expected, dis-
counted prots using a common discount factor of , 0    1. In each period they
decide whether to collude or compete in one or both markets. Deviations from the
agreed prices are met with optimal punishment strategies, i.e. the perfect equilibrium
providing the lowest prots (Abreu, 1988). In our context any deviation is punished
with eternal reversion to competition in both markets, thus, rms repeat the static
Bertrand solution and receive discounted prots of zero in both markets.
Collusion in a market leaves hard evidence and the possibility of antitrust enforce-
ment by the antitrust authority (AA, henceforth). There are three enforcement stages
in the prosecution of cartels. First, price-xing conspiracies need to be discovered.
Second, discovered conspiracy schemes need to be prosecuted. Finally, successfully
prosecuted cases need to be penalized to break up the existing cartels and deter the
formation of future cartels. As pointed out by Harrington (2006), the role of the an-
titrust authorities in the discovery stage has been minimal in that they are typically
a passive agent that responds to complaints by disgruntled employees and suspicious
customers who provide initial leads on price-xing schemes. To reect this reality,
we assume that if a cartel exists, the AA receives information about the cartel with
an exogenous probability of  ( 0), in each period.8 This probability of detection
is independent across markets and over time.9 The information provided to the AA
8Bryant and Eckart (1991) use a large sample of DOJ cases and nd that the probability that a
price-xing conspiracy will be indicted in a given year is at most between 0.13 and 0.17.
9We introduce the possibility of antitrust spillovers across markets in Section 4.
6is hard evidence and the basis of the AA's use of its investigative powers in the sec-
ond phase. The nal stage is captured by the following two implications for rms.
First, the antitrust authority imposes the maximal stipulated ne F > 0 on each cartel
member.10 Moreover, a successful prosecution imposes antitrust compliance of rms in
the cartelized market. This assumption captures the idea that after an investigation
rms remain to some extent \under the radar" of the AA. Either indirectly because
the AA has obtained useful market information during the investigation which allows
light monitoring. Or directly in case the AA requires rms to produce reports on their
market strategy. In fact, Kovacic et al. (2006) analyze the pricing of the Vitamin cartel
members after their conviction and show that all except two of the Vitamin markets
displayed a downward adjustment of prices during 12 to 36 months before arriving at
a new price level that seemed to correspond to a new more competitive equilibrium.11
For simplicity, we assume that, once convicted, rms never engage in collusion in the
same market again.12 Finally, we impose a parameter restriction on the discount factor
and the detection probability which is a necessary condition for collusion to be sus-
tainable in the model.
Assumption.
(A3) (1   )  1=2.
Note that this constraint requires   1=2 and   1=2.
To summarize, the timing of the repeated stage game is as follows. Firms decide
whether to collude in one market, both markets or not at all as a function of the
prosecution history. Firms set their prices and receive their prots. At the end of the
period the AA discovers and prosecutes a cartel with probability . Upon prosecution
rms pay the ne and stop xing prices in the market. In the next section we analyze
the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we consider an exogenous antitrust enforcement regime. In each period
a cartel is detected and successfully prosecuted with probability . Upon prosecution
10For example, the European Commission can impose a maximum amount of 10% of the company's
total revenues in the year preceding the decision. In the U.S. the maximum ne for a company is the
greatest of $100 million, twice the gross gain to the cartel or twice the gross harm of the cartel.
11Only the carotinoids took a full three years after the last formal cartel meeting before prices
started to go down.
12The qualitative nature of our results does not change if this desistance eect is only temporary,
say for T periods.
7rms pay a ne and cease to collude in this market forever. This means that rms
are in one of three states: (i) no cartel has been prosecuted, (ii) a cartel has been
prosecuted in exactly one market, and (iii) a cartel in both markets has been convicted
(in which case rms receive a continuation value of zero). In the following we rst
analyze the sustainability of collusion in the rst two cases and then consider rms'
optimal cartel organization.
Sustainability of collusion in one market. Suppose that a cartel in exactly one
market has been desisted and rms return to competition in this market. Then, the
prots from collusion in the adjacent market are recursively dened as
V
C
1 = 1()=2   F + (1   )V
C
1 :
In the current period rms equally share prots in this market. The cartel is successfully
prosecuted with probability  in which case rms pay a ne of F and receive competitive
prots from the next period onwards. If the cartel is not detected, rms continue to
collude in the next period. This cartel is sustainable if collusion prots exceed the value
from a one-o price deviation and eternal reversion to the competitive equilibrium.





1   (1   )
 1();
or
((1   )   1=2)1()  F: (1)
The LHS of (1) is by Assumption (A3) always positive. The cartel is internally stable
if the expected, discounted future collusion prots outweigh the current gains from
deviation and the expected cartel ne. A tougher antitrust enforcement reduces the
value of collusion whereas higher industry prots stabilize the cartel. Note that the
latter implies that partial collusion is never optimal. Firms collude at the industry
prot maximizing price or there is no cartel at all. Dene F1 as the value of F that
satises condition (1) with equality and let V1 be the value function of a representative






1 if F  F1;
0 otherwise:
Sustainability of collusion in both markets. Now consider the situation in
which no cartel has been prosecuted in either market. Suppose rms collude in both
markets simultaneously. In the current period a rm receives half of each market's
8industry prot. If no cartel is detected, collusion persists in both markets. If one cartel
is detected, rms pay the antitrust ne and get the expected value from collusion in
the adjacent market. If both cartels are detected, rms are ned and collusion stops
thereafter. The present discounted value of a rm, V2, is recursively given by
V2 = 2() + (1   )




2() + 2(1   )V1   2F
1   (1   )2 :
Deviations are punished with Nash reversion in both markets. Thus, rms optimally
deviate (and shave the cartel price) in both markets and collusion is sustainable if and
only if V2  22() or, equivalently,
(1   )
2 2() + (1   )V1  2()=2 + F: (2)
This condition gives the per market incentive constraint for sustaining collusion. The
rst term on the LHS is the expected future cartel prot if no cartel is discovered. The
second term is the expected continuation prot if the cartel in the adjacent market is
discovered in the current period. These prots have to outweigh the market share gain
from deviation and the expected cost of antitrust enforcement.
Two cases have to be distinguished. First, suppose collusion in one market would
still be viable if the cartel in the other market is desisted, that is, condition (1) holds
and V1 = V C
1 . Then (2) can be written as
V
C
1   1() + [(1   )
2   1=2]
2()   1()
1   (1   )2  0: (3)
The net value from collusion in both markets, i.e. cartel prots minus deviation prots,
is decomposed in two parts. The rst term, V C
1   1(), is the cartel net value if the
adjacent market is competitive. From condition (1) follows that this expression is
decreasing in F, positive for F < F1 and zero if F = F1. The second term is the added
value from a cartel in the adjacent market. In each period of the expected, discounted
survival time of both cartels, total cartel prots increase or decrease by 2() 1().
This prot dierence enters both future expected cartel prots and the gains from
deviation in the current period. It raises discounted future prots by the probability
that no cartel is discovered in the current period. At the same time deviation prots
increase by the 50% market share gain from deviation. The overall net eect on cartel
stability depends on the sign of the term in brackets. If the bracketed term is positive
(negative), then higher per period prots from a cartel in the adjacent market raise
(reduce) overall cartel stability.
9From this follows that if a single-market cartel is viable, then collusion in both
markets is always sustainable if the second term in (3) is positive. This holds if either
products are substitutes and the cartel stability factor is positive or if products are
complements and (1   )2 < 1=2. On the other hand, if condition (1) is suciently
tight and the second term in (3) is negative, then multi-market collusion is harder to
sustain than single-market collusion. This can occur in two cases. First, it holds if
products are complements and (1 )2 > 1=2. In this case cartel stability increases in
cartel prots. This implies that if full collusion is not sustainable, then partial collusion
(with lower prices and prots) is not feasible either. And secondly, it holds if products
are substitutes and (1   )2 < 1=2. In this case the sustainability of multi-market
collusion increases if rms reduce prices and prots in both markets. Thus, although
full collusion is not sustainable, rms are able to implement partial collusion and supra-
competitive prots in both market. Denote as F2 the value of F such that condition
(3) holds if and only if F  F2. The following lemma formalizes this discussion.
Lemma 1 Suppose condition (1) holds, i.e. collusion in one market is sustainable
when the adjacent market is competitive.
(i) If (1   )2  1=2 and products are complements, then there exist values 0 < F2 
F  F1 such that collusion in both markets simultaneously is not sustainable.
(ii) If (1 )2 < 1=2 and products are substitutes, then there exist values maxf0;F2g 
F  F1 such that rms can only sustain partial collusion in a simultaneous cartel.
(iii) Otherwise, rms can always sustain a simultaneous cartel.
Now suppose condition (1) does not hold and collusion in one market would not be
viable if the adjacent market is competitive, i.e. V1 = 0. Then the per market incentive
constraint for sustaining both cartels is
[(1   )
2   1=2]2()  F: (4)
Firms have to sustain collusion with the cartel net value generated during the phase
in which none of the two cartels is discovered. This makes a positive cartel stability
factor, (1   )2 > 1=2, a necessary condition for successful collusion. Now compare
the single-market and multi-market incentive constraints. The dierences between (1)
and (4) are due to the demand linkage between markets and antitrust enforcement.
Cartelizing the adjacent market has a positive (negative) eect on per market prots if
products are substitutes (complements). At the same time antitrust enforcement and
reversion to competition is more likely if rms cartelize both markets. Thus, if prod-
ucts are complements, independent or weak substitutes, then multi-market collusion
is not sustainable if single-market collusion is not feasible. By contrast, if products
10are suciently close substitutes, then the positive prot eect outweighs the higher
antitrust risk and rms are able to sustain collusion in both markets although single-
market collusion is not feasible. This is formalized in the following lemma. Denote as
F3 the maximum value of F for which (4) holds.
Lemma 2 Suppose condition (1) does not hold, i.e. collusion in one market is not
sustainable if the adjacent market is competitive. If (1   )2 > 1=2 and   1, with
1 > 0, then there exist parameter values F1  F  F3 such that rms can sustain
collusion in both markets simultaneously. Otherwise, collusion is not sustainable.
Optimal Organization of Collusion. Collusion in both markets simultaneously
is not always possible and may not always be the prot-maximizing organization of
collusion. Consider sequential cartels instead. Firms cartelize one market and price
competitively in the adjacent market. Once the cartel has been discovered and desisted,
they start collusion in the second market. Such sequential collusion yields a present









This sequential cartel organization is sustainable if and only if condition (1) holds. To
see this note that the rst cartel is always easier to sustain than the second because a
deviating rm loses the discounted value of both streams of collusive prots. Thus, as
long as the constraint for the second cartel, (1), holds, rms can sustain both cartels.
If (1) does not hold, then the rst cartel faces the same incentive constraint as the
second cartel and is therefore not viable.
Now suppose both simultaneous and sequential cartels are internally stable, i.e. F 
minfF1;F2g. What are the strategic incentives for a sequential cartel? Simultaneously
cartelizing both markets dominates sequential cartels if and only if V2  V11, or,
1   





1   (1   )2  0: (5)
From an ex ante point of view, rms cartelize each market for the same expected time
under both types of collusion. In a simultaneous cartel rms collude in two markets
from the beginning whereas in a sequential cartel the second market is cartelized later.
The rst term in (5) is the expected, discounted prot advantage of a simultaneous
cartel from having the second cartel earlier. This expression is always positive. The
second term is the expected, discounted prot dierence per market as long as both
cartels remain undetected in the simultaneous collusion scheme. If the products are
substitutes, then 2() > 1() and a simultaneous cartel allows rms to implement
11a higher per market prot in this phase. If the products are complements, a sequential
cartel yields higher prots per market. From this follows that if products are substitutes
or independent, then both terms in (5) are weakly positive and it is always optimal for
rms to collude simultaneously in both markets. If products are complements, then
rms have to trade o the higher per period prots in a sequential cartel with the
later start of the cartel in the adjacent market. The advantage of a sequential cartel
is bigger, the stronger the complementarity between the markets. The advantage of
having the second cartel earlier in a simultaneous cartel decreases with the antitrust
ne F. Hence, there exists a threshold value F4 such that for F  F4, rms prefer
sequential collusion. Moreover, note that the more patient rms are, the smaller the
advantage of a simultaneous cartel. In particular, if  = 1, then the arrival time of the
second cartel is irrelevant and a simultaneous (sequential) cartel dominates if products
are substitutes (complements). We formalize this discussion as follows.
Lemma 3 Suppose simultaneous and sequential cartels are sustainable.
(i) If products are substitutes, rms always prefer to form a simultaneous cartel.
(ii) If products are complements and F  F4, then rms prefer a sequential cartel.
(iii) It holds that @F4=@  0 and there exist 2 and 3, with  < 2  3  0 such
that F4  0 i   2, and F4  minfF1;F2g i   3.
We are now in a position to characterize optimal dynamic cartel formation. In the
following proposition we focus on the case where the stability of a simultaneous cartel
increases in its prots. We comment on the case where (1 )2  1=2 in the discussion
below.
Proposition 1 Assume (1   )2  1=2 and consider optimal cartel formation.
(i) If F  minfF1;F2;F4g, then rms cartelize both markets and continue collusion in
the adjacent market if one cartel is desisted.
(ii) If products are complements and minfF2;F4g < F  F1, then rms cartelize one
market and start collusion in the adjacent market if this cartel is desisted.
(iii) If products are substitutes and F1 < F  F3, then rms cartelize both markets and
stop collusion in both markets if one cartel is desisted.
(iv) If F  maxfF1;F3g, there is no collusion.
Proposition 1 identies four parameter regimes with dierent cartel dynamics and
antitrust interventions. Figure 1 illustrates the regimes corresponding to Proposition
1 in a (F;)-diagram using the prot functions derived from Example 1 in Section 2.
12Figure 1: Optimal Cartel Formation for (1   )2  1=2.
In regions (i) cartel deterrence is low and markets are neither strong substitutes nor
strong complements. Here rms collude in both markets until the AA has successfully
prosecuted both cartels. In particular, if the AA detects and desists one cartel, the
cartel in the adjacent market remains active. In region (ii) rms start colluding in both
markets simultaneously. However, in this regime antitrust prosecution has a knock-on
eect due to the negative demand linkage. If exactly one of the two cartels is discovered,
rms disrupt their cartel activity in the prosecuted market and the price returns to the
competitive level. Since products are substitutes, demand and prots in the adjacent
market decrease and erode cartel stability in the non-prosecuted market. Hence in this
regime, one antitrust intervention is sucient to eliminate collusion in both markets.
A necessary condition for this knock-on eect to exist is that antitrust nes are neither
too low nor too high. If they are low, rms continue to collude in the adjacent market.
If they are high, all cartel activities are deterred. In region (iii) rms form sequential
cartels for two reasons. First, a sequential cartel dominates cartelizing both markets
while both types of cartels are viable. This occurs if products are suciently strong
complements. And second, a sequential cartel is chosen because a simultaneous cartel
is not viable. This happens if antitrust nes (and deterrence) are intermediate, i.e.
F2 < F  F1. In both cases, rms collude until the AA has successfully prosecuted a
cartel in each market, but unlike in region (i), here, the AA always has to desist the
cartels one by one. Finally, in region (iv) antitrust deterrence is suciently high to
prevent cartel formation ex ante.
To conclude this section, let us briey comment on the case where the stability of a
simultaneous cartel decreases in the cartel's current period prots, i.e. (1 )2 < 1=2.
13It follows straight from Lemma 2 that if F > F1, then collusion is never feasible. Con-
sider the case where a cartel in one market is sustainable while the adjacent market is
competitive, F  F1. From Lemma 1 it follows that if products are complements, then
a simultaneous cartel is always sustainable. However, it is dominated by a sequential
cartel if and only if F  F4. If products are substitutes, rms resort to partial collusion
in both markets if maxf0;F2g  F  F1; otherwise, they are able to implement full
collusion in both markets. Note that partial collusion always dominates a sequential
cartel organization for these parameter values. To see this verify from (3) that at
F = F1, where V C
1 = 1(), rms are able to sustain a per market prot of 1().
For any lower value of F rms can sustain higher prots. Since the prot stream with
partial collusion has to match simultaneous deviation in both markets, a partially col-
luding cartel has an expected value of at least 21(), which strictly dominates what
a sequential cartel can achieve.
4 Optimal Cartel Prosecution
In this section we extend the analysis and explore the incentives of an Antitrust Au-
thority (AA) to invest in cartel prosecution resources in our framework. We posit that
the intensity of cartel prosecution is limited by the resources that the AA devotes to
it.13 In particular, we suppose that an AA with a low cartel prosecution budget acts
as a passive agent who can only follow up on cartel leads it receives from the industry.
A well-funded cartel prosecution unit, by contrast, is able to use an initial cartel lead
in one market and extend, if necessary, the investigation into adjacent markets.
Consider the following simple extension of the model. As before, we assume that a
cartel is discovered with an exogenous probability  and produces hard evidence that
the AA can use to successfully prosecute the cartel. To start an investigation the AA
needs at least one cartel lead. Suppose that in each period the AA has sucient re-
sources to follow up and successfully prosecute all cartels for which it receives cartel
leads. Alternatively, the AA can adopt a pro-active stance by investing ex ante in its
cartel prosecution resources. The investment cost is I  0. This is the cost of increas-
ing the overall budget of the AA and/or the opportunity cost of shifting resources from
13Connor (2007), for example, argues that after the successful reforms of antitrust laws in the last
two decades, the main current impediment to antitrust enforcement is the serious under-funding of
competition authorities around the world. In the US an increase in merger activities and high-prole
cases such as Microsoft have absorbed large proportions of the DOJ resources and \... the Division's
employees are in danger of being overworked or potential antitrust violations going uninvestigated."
(Connor 2007, p. 421)
14other policy areas, like mergers or state aids into cartel prosecution. The investment
allows the AA to open - when required - more comprehensive investigations. In par-
ticular, in our context, if the AA receives a cartel lead in exactly one market, the AA
is able to extend the investigation into the adjacent market and successfully prosecute
the second cartel.14
The AA minimizes the sum of the expected loss of consumer surplus due to cartel
activities and its enforcement cost. Denote S2(), S1() and S0() as the per period
consumer surplus in both markets if there is collusion in both markets, collusion in
one market only, and no collusion, respectively. Then the per period loss of consumer
surplus due to a cartel in one market is dened as L1() = S0() S1(). Similarly, the
consumer welfare (across the two markets) if both markets are cartelized is L2() =




1 < 0, L0
1  L0
2,
(A5) L1() = L2(), 2L1(0) = L2(0), L1( ) = 0 < L2( ),
(A6) (1   )2  1=2
Consumer loss from a cartel with a competitive adjacent market is strictly decreasing
in the substitutability (or increasing in the complementarity) of the markets. If both
markets are cartelized, then consumer loss might increases or decrease in  but its slope
is always weakly higher compared to the loss with a competitive adjacent market. If
products are perfect complements, then a cartel in one market is able to fully extract
the cartel surplus from the adjacent market. If markets are independent, two cartels
create double the harm of one cartel. If products are perfect substitutes, then one
cartelized market is not causing any loss in consumer surplus whereas consumers are
strictly harmed if both markets are cartelized. Further it follows from (A4) and (A5)
that the welfare loss with two active cartels is at least as high as with one cartel and
thatL2() L1() > (<)L1() if and only if the markets are substitutes (complements).
The latter means that if products are substitutes (complements), then desisting a
cartel is more desirable if the adjacent market is collusive (competitive). Finally, by
assumption (A6), we focus in this section on the parameter case where a simultaneous
cartel becomes more stable if its per period prots increase.
In the following we derive optimal cartel formation if the AA operates with a large
prosecution budget and rms expect antitrust spillovers. Then, we compare with the
14In equilibrium, the AA knows when it is optimal for rms to form simultaneous cartels and
investigations in the adjacent market only occur when there is a cartel to be prosecuted.
15outcome in the benchmark model. Finally, we analyze the AA's incentives to invest in
its prosecution resources.
Cartel Formation with Antitrust Spillovers. Suppose the AA has invested in
its prosecution budget. If the AA receives two cartel leads it prosecutes both cartels.
If it receives one cartel lead, it investigates and prosecutes the cartel in the adjacent
market, too. Firms anticipate that if they are caught in at least one market, both
cartels are prosecuted. Thus, the expected value from colluding in both market, V S
2 ,
is implicitly dened by
V
S
2 = 2() + (1   )
2V
S





2()   (2   )2F
1   (1   )2 :
This discounted, expected prot with antitrust spillovers is less than what rms achieve
in a simultaneous cartel in the benchmark model. Consequently, a simultaneous cartel
is harder to sustain and more likely to be dominated by a sequential cartel. To see
this consider in turn the cartel stability condition and the condition under which a
simultaneous cartel dominates a sequential cartel. Collusion with antitrust spillovers
is sustainable if V S
2  22 or
[(1   )
2   1=2]2()  (2   )F: (6)
Denote F S
3 the threshold value such that for all F  F S
3 a simultaneous cartel is viable.
The only dierence to the cartel stability condition in the benchmark model is that with
antitrust spillovers, the cartel's net value has to overcome a higher expected cost from
antitrust enforcement. Hence, it has to hold that F S
3 < F3. Now consider sequential
cartels. If rms form one cartel at a time, antitrust spillovers are not eective and
sequential cartels are viable if and only if F  F1. Compare the sustainability of a
sequential and a simultaneous cartel.
Lemma 4 There exists a S
1 > 1 > 0 such that the following holds.
(i) If   S
1 , then there exist values F1  F  F S
3 such that a simultaneous cartel is
sustainable while a sequential cartel is not.
(ii) If   S
1 , then there exist values F S
3  F  F1 such that a sequential cartel is
sustainable while a simultaneous cartel is not.
(iii) If F  minfF1;F S
3 g, then both forms of cartel organization are sustainable.
(iv) Otherwise, collusion is deterred.
16In the benchmark model a simultaneous (sequential) cartel is easier to sustain if mar-
kets are substitutes (complements). With antitrust spillover a simultaneous (sequen-
tial) cartel is easier to sustain if products are suciently close substitutes (complements
or weak substitutes). Suppose that both simultaneous and sequential cartels are sus-









1   (1   )2  
2(1   )(V C
1 + F)
1   (1   )2  0: (7)
The rst two terms are the same as in (5) in the benchmark model. The third term is
the additional, relative cost of a simultaneous cartel due to the antitrust spillover. If
exactly one cartel is detected, rms lose the prot stream of the cartel in the adjacent
market and they pay the ne. This loss is discounted by the expected arrival time of
an antitrust spillover. Dene F S
4 as the value of F such that (7) holds with equality.
Consider the properties of this threshold and compare it with the threshold values for
cartel sustainability.
Lemma 5 Suppose simultaneous and sequential cartels are sustainable. If F  F S
4 ,
then rms prefer to form a sequential cartel. It holds that F S
4 < F4. F S
4 increases in 
and there exist S
2 and S
3 , with 2 < S
2  S
3 < S
1 , such that F S
4  0 i   S
2 , and
F4  minfF1;F S
3 g i   S
3 .
The fact that S
3 < S
1 establishes that - like in the benchmark model - sequential cartels
might form for two reasons. First, a sequential cartel dominates the simultaneous
cartel while both are feasible. This occurs for F  minfF1;F S
3 g and F  F S
4 . Second,
a sequential cartel forms because a simultaneous cartel is deterred which holds for
F S
3  F  F1.
Proposition 2 Consider optimal cartel formation with antitrust spillovers.
(i) If F  minfF S
3 ;F S
4 g, then rms cartelize both markets.
(ii) If minfF S
3 ;F S
4 g < F  F1, then rms cartelize one market and start collusion in
the adjacent market if the cartel has been desisted.
(iii) Otherwise, there is no collusion.
Before analyzing the optimal prosecution strategy, it is useful to compare cartel for-
mation without antitrust spillovers to the results of Proposition 2. As discussed above,
cartel spillovers reduce the protability of a simultaneous cartel. This has two eects.
First, it increases rms' incentives to form sequential cartel which are unaected by
spillovers. Second, if sequential cartels are not sustainable, then the threat of antitrust
spillovers can deter the ex ante formation of cartels. This is illustrated in Figure 2
which plots the threshold values in a F- diagram using Example 1 from Section 2.
17Figure 2: Optimal Cartel Formation with and without antitrust spillovers..
Sequential cartels are viable if and only if F  F1. In regions A and C optimal cartel
organization is independent of the AA's prosecution strategy. In region A rms form
sequential cartels; in region C they always form simultaneous cartels. By contrast, in
region B rms choose a simultaneous cartel if the AA uses a low budget prosecution
strategy while they form a sequential cartel in the presence of antitrust spillovers. In
region D, E and F sequential cartels are not sustainable. In region D rms cartelize
both markets but after at least one cartel is detected and prosecuted, both markets
become competitive. In region E prosecution resources aect the level of deterrence. A
low prosecution budget leads to a simultaneous cartel that breaks down if at least one
cartel is desisted whereas the possibility of antitrust spillovers deters cartel formation.
In region F, cartel formation is deterred independent of the prosecution strategy.
Optimal Cartel Prosecution. We now investigate under which conditions the AA
has an incentive to invest in prosecution resources. In region A rms form sequential
cartels independent of the prosecution strategy. Since antitrust spillovers are ineective
with sequential cartels, there is no gain for the AA from investing in prosecution
resources. In region B, prosecution resources aect the optimal organization of the
cartel. If the AA does not invest, rms form a simultaneous cartel. The ex ante
discounted and expected consumer welfare loss from a simultaneous cartel without
antitrust spillover, W2, is recursively dened as
W2 = L2() + 2(1   )W
C







1   (1   )
:
18is the discounted and expected welfare loss from a cartel in one market while the
adjacent market is competitive. Solving yields
W2 =
2L1()
1   (1   )
+
L2()   2L1()
1   (1   )2 :
The rst term is the expected loss from cartels in both markets while the adjacent mar-
ket is competitive. The second term is the prot adjustment due to the demand linkage
during the phase in which both markets are cartelized. This expression is positive if
products are substitutes and negative if they are complements. Now suppose the AA
increases its prosecution budget and rms form a sequential cartel. The discounted,
expected welfare loss from a sequential cartel is
W11 = [1 +

1   (1   )
]
L1()
1   (1   )
;
which is the sum of the two single-market cartels where the second cartel is discounted
by its later expected starting date. Investing in prosecution resources is optimal if the
welfare gain from facing a sequential rather than a simultaneous cartel outweighs the
cost, W2   W11  I, or
(1   )L1()
(1   (1   ))2 +
L2()   2L1()
1   (1   )2  I: (8)
The rst term is the dierence in expected, discounted harm due to the fact that in
a sequential cartel one market is cartelized later. If the AA does not discount future
losses, this expression is zero. The second term is the eect of the demand linkage in
a simultaneous cartel while both markets are cartelized. It is positive if products are
substitutes and negative with complements. Overall, the welfare gain from a sequential
cartel, i.e. the LHS of (8), is strictly positive for substitutes and weak complements.
With perfect complements, the per period welfare loss is independent of how many
markets are cartelized and a simultaneous cartel is strictly superior - from the AA's
perspective - because of its lower expected, discounted duration. Furthermore, it can
be shown that, by assumption (A4), the welfare gain from a sequential cartel, increases
in the demand linkage parameter. Hence, the AA invests in cartel prosecution if  is
suciently large.
Lemma 6 Consider parameter region B. There exists a B(I), with 0
B > 0 and  <
B(0) < 0, such that the AA invests in prosecution resources if and only if   B(I).
In region C rms form simultaneous cartels independent of the AA's prosecution
strategies. The discounted, expected welfare loss with a simultaneous cartel and an-
titrust spillovers, denoted by W S
2 , is the welfare loss from a simultaneous cartel over





1   (1   )2:
The AA invests in prosecution resources if and only if the welfare gains from an antitrust
spillover outweigh the budgetary cost, i.e. W2   W S
2  I or
2(1   )
1   (1   )2
L1()
1   (1   )
 I: (9)
A large budget allows to investigate and prosecute in both markets if the AA detects
one cartel while rms cartelize both markets. The rst factor on the LHS is the
expected, discounted time for such an antitrust spillover to occur. The second factor is
the harm avoided by the spillover, i.e. the welfare loss from one cartel with an adjacent
competitive market. Since this harm is strictly decreasing in , it is optimal for the
AA to invest in prosecution if and only if the demand linkage parameter is suciently
small.
Lemma 7 Consider parameter region C. There exists a C(I), with 0
C < 0 and
C(0) =  , such that the AA invests in prosecution resources if and only if   C(I).
In region D a cartel in one market is not sustainable if the adjacent market is
competitive. If the AA detects and prosecutes one cartel, rms revert to competition in
the adjacent market. This knock-on eect through cartel stability is a perfect substitute
for antitrust spillovers. Hence, the AA has no incentive to invest in this parameter
region.
In region E sequential cartels are not viable. If the AA's prosecution budget is
low, rms form a simultaneous cartel that breaks down in both markets if at least one
cartel is detected. If the AA has a high prosecution budget, cartels are deterred. Thus,
the AA has an incentive to invest in prosecution if the welfare gain from deterring a
simultaneous cartel outweighs the budgetary cost,
L2()
1   (1   )2  I: (10)
Check that this constraint is always easier to satisfy than condition (8), i.e. the AA
has more incentives to invest in region E than in region B. To see this compare ex
ante and ex post incentives. Without investment simultaneous cartels form in both
regions. However, the expected welfare loss in region B is higher because in the case
where only one cartel is detected, rms keep on colluding in the adjacent market in
region B but not in E. This provides stronger incentives to invest in region B by the
20magnitude of the welfare loss from a cartel in one market discounted by the cartel's
expected start date. With investment, a cartel in region E is deterred whereas in region
B rms form a sequential cartel. This provides stronger incentives to invest in region
E by the magnitude of the welfare loss from a sequential cartel. Clearly, the stronger
ex post incentives for region E outweigh the stronger ex ante incentives of region B.
Finally, in region F cartels are deterred independent of the prosecution resources
and the AA does not require to invest in additional resources. We summarize this
discussion by characterizing the optimal prosecution strategy as a function of whether
a simultaneous cartel can be deterred with and/or without the AA's investment.
Proposition 3 Assume I is suciently low.
(i) Suppose deterrence is weak such that simultaneous cartels form independent of pros-
ecution resources. Then the AA invests in prosecution resources if and only if the mar-
kets are neither strong substitutes nor strong complements.
(ii) Suppose deterrence is intermediate such that simultaneous cartels form with a low
but not with a high prosecution budget. Then the AA invests only if products are sub-
stitutes or weak complements.
(iii) Otherwise, the AA never invests in prosecution resources.
The AA's optimal prosecution strategy interacts with the level of ex ante cartel de-
terrence. Point (i) of Proposition 3 refers to parameter constellations in which cartel
deterrence is low and rms form simultaneous cartels even if the AA has invested in
prosecution resources, i.e. F  F S
3 . In such situations the optimal prosecution budget
is non-linear in the demand linkage parameter . For strong complements (region A)
rms form sequential cartels. For close substitutes (region D), the successful prose-
cution of a cartel in one market has a knock-on eect on the cartel in the adjacent
market. In both cases a small prosecution budget is optimal. For intermediate values
of  there exist two cases. In region B a high prosecution budget leads to sequential
cartels which is desirable if the demand linkage parameter is suciently high,   B.
In region C rms form simultaneous cartels and increasing prosecution resources is
benecial if products are not too close substitutes,   C. However, as shown in
Lemma 6 and 7, as the investment cost I goes to zero, B decreases and it is strictly
negative while C increases and approaches  . Hence, there must exist intermediate
values of the demand linkage parameter for which it is optimal to invest in prosecution
resources. Next consider intermediate levels of ex ante cartel deterrence. Point (ii)
of the proposition refers to values of F such that simultaneous cartels are deterred
with antitrust spillover (F > F S
3 ) but sustainable if the AA does not invest (F 
minfF2; maxfF1;F3gg). Three dierent cases can arise. For suciently low values of 
21sequential cartels are sustainable (regions A and B) and the AA invests like in the low
deterrence case, that is for   B. The dierence to point (i) in Proposition 3 arises
if products are suciently close substitutes. In region E, sequential cartels are not sus-
tainable and simultaneous cartels only form if the AA does not invest. Thus, the AA
is able to deter collusion by investing in prosecution resources. Moreover, as pointed
out above, the AA always has a stronger incentive to invest in region E compared to
region B. So, if the investment cost I is suciently small, then point (ii) follows and
the AA invests if and only if the demand linkage parameter is suciently large. Finally,
consider point (iii) and cases where deterrence is high such that simultaneous cartels
never form. Then rms either form sequential cartels (F2 < F  F1) or there is no
collusion at all. In both cases, the AA has no incentive to invest in prosecution.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze cartel dynamics of multi-market rms in the presence of
antitrust enforcement. We show that demand relationships create important eects for
cartel prosecution. Antitrust intervention in one market can reduce cartel stability and
have a knock-on eect on cartel activities in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution
might also have a waterbed eect by increasing cartel stability and trigger collusion in
previously competitive markets.
Our further analysis evaluates the implications of these eects for the optimal size
of the cartel prosecution budget of an antitrust authority. With low ex ante cartel
deterrence, investing in prosecution resources is optimal only if markets are neither
strong complements nor strong substitutes. For intermediate levels of ex ante deter-
rence, a high prosecution budget is optimal only if products are substitutes or weak
complements.
22Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
From (3) follows that F2 is implicitly dened by
F2 = [1  
1   (1   )




[1   (1   )][(1   )2   1=2]
1   (1   )2 2():
If (1   )2  1=2, then the RHS is strictly positive and F2 > 0. Next consider
F1   F2 =
1   (1   )
1   (1   )2 [(1   )2   1=2][1()   2()]:
This implies that F2  F1 if the product of the squared brackets is positive. Point (i) in the
lemma refers to the case where both brackets are positive. Point (ii) holds if (1 )2 < 1=2
and 1() < 2(). In this case it follows from (3) that the sustainability of a simultaneous
cartel increases if 2() decreases. Denote as 2() the maximum per market prot 2()
that satises (3),
2() = 1() +
1   (1   )2
1=2   (1   )2 [V C
1   1()]:
Since the second term is positive for any F  F1, rms can always sustain strictly positive
partial collusion prots for maxf0;F2g  F  F1. From this the lemma follows. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2
There exist values such that condition (4) holds while (1) does not hold if and only if
F3   F1 =
((1   )2   1=2)

2()  







(1   )2   1=2
(1   )   1=2
: (A-1)
The LHS is decreasing in  by assumption (A1). By assumption (A2) it takes value 1 at
 = 0 and value 0 at  . If (1   )2 < 1=2, then the RHS is negative and F1 > F3 for all .
If (1 )2  1=2, then the RHS is positive but less than 1. It follows that there is a unique
value 1 > 0 such that F3  F1 if and only if   1. QED.
Proof of Lemma 3






(1   )(1   (1   )2)
:
Point (i) of the lemma follows from the discussion in the text. Consider   0. Check that
@F4=@  0 if and only if
0
1()  [1  
2
(1   )(1   (1   )2) + 22]20
2():
23The fraction in the squared bracket is always positive but less than 1=2 which implies that
the squared bracket has a value between 1=2 and 1. Thus, by assumption (A1), this condition





(1   )(1   (1   )2) + 22]:
By assumptions (A1) and (A2) the LHS is strictly decreasing in  taking value 2 at  = 
and value 1 at  = 0. The RHS takes values in [1;2]. It follows that there exist a unique
2 < 0 such that F4  0 if and only if   2. To show that the last part of point (iii) in the
lemma note that if (1   )2  1=2, then F2  F1 and the binding sustainability constraint




2(1   )(1   (1   )2)
1   (1   ) + 
:
The LHS is decreasing in , takes value 2 at  =  and value 1 at  = 0. The RHS is larger
than 1 and decreasing in . Its maximum at  = 0 is 3+2(1 ) which is less than 2 for any
  1=2. It follows that there exists a unique value 0
3 < 0 such that F4  F2 if and only if
  0
3. If (1   )2 < 1=2, then F1  F2 and the binding sustainability constraint is (1). F1
is decreasing in  and equal to F2 at  = 0. F4 is increasing in  and equal to F2 at  = 0
3.
Hence, there exists a value 00
3 < 0
3 < 0 such that F4  F1 if and only if   00
3. QED.
Proofs of Lemma 4 and 5
For Lemma 4 verify that FS




(1   )2   1=2
((1   )   1=2)(2   )
:
The RHS is strictly smaller than the RHS in (A-1). Hence there exists a S
1 > 1 such that
FS
3  F1 if and only if   S
1 . The lemma follows.
For Lemma 5 dierentiating the LHS of (7) with respect to F yields
 
(1   )[3(1   )(1   (1   )) + ]
[1   (1   )2][1   (1   )]2 < 0:
Thus, (7) holds if F is suciently low or, vice versa, sequential cartels are optimal if F  FS
4 .
Solving (7) for F gives
FS
4 =
[1   (1   )]22()   [1   (1   )2][1   (1   2)]1()=2
(1   )[3(1   )(1   (1   )) + ]
:
Next check that F4 > FS




2[1   (1   )]
1   (1   2)
:
24which holds since by assumptions (A1) and (A2) the LHS takes values between 0 and 2 while
the RHS is greater than 2. Further FS
4 is increasing in  if and only if
0
1() < [1  
(2      2(1   )2)
(1   (1   )2)(1   (1   2))
]20
2():
The numerator of the fraction on the RHS is positive for (1 )  1=2. Hence, the fraction is
positive, the squared bracket is less than 1 and by assumption (A1) this condition is satised.
Existence and uniqueness of S
2 and S
3 , with S
2  S
3 , follow from F4 < FS
4 and the fact
that FS
4 is increasing while F1 is decreasing in . Finally, to show that S
3 < S
1 note that
along F1 it holds that V C
1 = 1 and V11 = [1   (1   ) + ]1=[1   (1   )]. Along FS
3 it
holds that V S
2 = 22. Thus, at F1(S
1 ) = FS
3 (S





1   (1   ) + 
which always holds since S
1 < 0, 1(S
1 )=2(S
1 ) < 1 and the RHS is strictly larger than 1.
From this and @FS
4 =@ > 0 and Lemma 4 follows S
3 < S
1 . QED.




(1   (1   ))2(1   (1   )2)
+
L2()   L1()
1   (1   )2  I: (A-2)
By Assumption (A4), the rst term on the LHS is strictly and the second weakly increasing
in . It follows that the welfare gain from a sequential cartel strictly increases. At  =  it
holds that L1() = L2(). Hence the second term in (A-2) is zero and the LHS is negative.
The rest of the lemma follows from the positive slope of the LHS, its negative value at  = 
and its non-negative value at  = 0 (see text). QED.
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